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VOLUME XXII

NUMBER 2

Interstate Use of Water"Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo"
Frank J. Trelease*
INTRODUCTION-

"SPORHASE V. EL PASO"

The Western states share with other political subdivisions a strong
attachment to their land, streams, rivers, lakes, and even their groundwater. The waters offered them amenities and riches, environmental
treasures and the means to exploit their soil and mineral resources and
to supply a healthy and growing population. The miners, farmers, and
ranchers who pioneered the Western territories took "their" water by the
simple act of diverting and using it, and claimed that these acts gave them
a "water right" to continue to take it in the future.
The earliest prior appropriator-"first taker" in Anglo-Saxon English
-defended his water with Colt and Winchester,' but his self-created right
was soon enforced by courts and legislatures. The states and territories
exacted a price for this protection in the form of standardization and
regulation of water rights. In their constitutions and statutes they
declared that the state, or the public, owned the water and that this intangible, non-possessory, non-usufructuary, paper claim gave them the
power to limit and regulate the rights they allowed the appropriator to
obtain.2
By 1890 the appropriation was no longer a taking by individuals, but
a grant from the state. It became a dispensation that the state might
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
* Dean Frank J. Trelease died while this article was in preparation. Professor George
A. Gould, McGeorge School of Law, assembled the article from drafts of its various parts.
While some editing was required, the ideas are exclusively those of Dean Trelease.
1. See Territory of Montana v. Drennan, 1 Mont. 41 (1868). The court held that it was
not a defense to a charge of assault with a deadly weapon that the victim had diverted the
defendant's water.
2. See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV.

638 (1975).
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withhold unless the applicant for a water right met certain engineering
standards, accepted limitations on the amount of water that might be
used, and fulfilled a requirement that the use be for a beneficial purpose.
Nor was this all, the permit to appropriate might be withheld unless the
state officials found that the use would further the public interest.3
One public interest seen by most of the Western states was the desirability of using water to develop their other resources-land, minerals,
even flora and fauna. At least seven of the thirteen Western states enacted
specific laws prohibiting or restricting the export of water to other states,
and in the remaining states the public interest limitations might be used
to the same end.' Some of these were absolute bans on export, others allowed the export if the receiving state reciprocated, some required legislative permission for each outflow.
The question of the validity of these restraints on the movement of
water across state lines under the commerce clause5 was early put in question. In 1908, Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,6 seemed to establish
their validity, but in the 1960's doubt was cast upon them by a lower court
case which the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.' Then in 1982,
the United States Supreme Court announced its holding in Sporhase v.
Nebraska,8 a simple case, but one that rested on a complex of legal formulas and practical factors that uphold some state restraints on export
but would strike down others.
Sporhase owned two adjoining farms, separated by the ColoradoNebraska state line. The Nebraska farm was irrigated from a well, pumped
by virtue of the common law "correlative right" of a Nebraska land owner
to underlying groundwater. The well complied with local "natural resources district" conservation regulations dealing with well spacing, allowable quantities, and rates of pumping. Sporhase attempted to take the
water across the line to irrigate his Colorado farm, but was enjoined for
violation of a Nebraska statute that required a permit from the State Department of Water Resources to withdraw Nebraska groundwater for export. These permits were normally issued if the Department found the
withdrawal to be reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use
of the resource, not detrimental to the public interest and if the receiving
state granted reciprocal rights to use its water within Nebraska.9 Since
Colorado had placed a complete ban on water exports to other states,
Sporhase could not meet the last requirement and could get no permit.
3. Trelease, Water Law, Policies and Politics, Institutions for Decision Making in
Western Water Resources: ComingProblems, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1979).
4. Examples of these laws can be found in Clyde, State Prohibitionson the Interstate
Exportation of Scarce Water Resources, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 529, 530 (1982), and Tarlock,
So its Not "Ours"- Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First Look at Sporhase v. Nebraska,
XVIII LAND & WATER L. REV. 137, 143-44 (1983).
5. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
7. City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
8. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1984).
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This absolute ban on exports, said the Supreme Court, was a violation
of the commerce clause of the constitution.
Sporhase presents no surprise in its proposition that the commerce
clause creates federal powers over water. Despite state claims to ownership, it has always been known the United States has many powers over
water. The navigation servitude has its roots in the commerce clause.'"
The federal government has the power to take water for federal purposes."
It may prevent the use of water that results in frustration of a federal
purpose. 2 Congress has always had power to deal with water on a national
scale because the constitution expressly grants to Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the states. This does not preclude, however,
3
state regulation of water on a local scale,' and while Congress may
preempt and supplant state law, it 4may leave room for consistent state
and federal laws to work together.
But even if Congress has not exercised its powers, the Supreme Court
has developed the "negative commerce clause," under which Congress may
nullify a state action that unreasonably interferes with commerce. Applying this doctrine to Nebraska groundwater, Sporhase held that when
exercising its police power over a resource, a state may not unreasonably
5
restrict its use to home consumption. The citizens and residents of other
states must get a fair crack at it. Thus, the commerce clause in the constitution is more than a positive grant of power to Congress. The "negative
commerce clause" that the Supreme Court has added is more than jealous
protection of national power; it is the guarantee of an important freedom
to the people of the United States.
Yet, the Sporhase Court recognized that the states do have a very
real and substantial interest in local control of waters. The commerce
clause does not negate all state controls over local resources destined for
export, only those that place an unreasonable burden on commerce are
proscribed. The applicable test for reasonableness was laid down in the
1970 case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate activities.'"
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 181 (1946.
Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 105, 108 (1829).
See First Iowa, 328 U.S. at 176.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982).
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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Nebraska's claim to ownership of the water was said to be a fictionlegal shorthand for the state's police power over this important resource.
However, it was also said to be indicative of the water-short state's
legitimate desire to preserve and protect this vital resource for its own
citizens under certain circumstances: to protect the health not simply the
economy, of its people; to protect its legal expectations arising out of
equitable apportionment decrees and interstate compacts; to give a limited
preference to its own citizens in the utilization of the resource; and to favor
its own citizens in the use of water it produces and owns by virtue of its
conservation efforts.' 7
Under the Pike test and in the light of these considerations, the first
three requirements for the Nebraska export permit-reasonableness, conservation and the public interest-might be justified. However, the flat
refusal to allow any export to Colorado was held facially discriminatory,
not justifiable as a conservation measure.
Sporhase was followed shortly by City of El Paso v. Reynolds (ElPaso
1). '8 El Paso, Texas, sits just below New Mexico's
southern border in the
Rio Grande Valley. To support its growing population and stimulate economic growth, the city filed applications with the New Mexico state engineer to appropriate practically all of the safe yield of a large aquifer in
the New Mexico section of that valley. All applications were denied on
the basis of a New Mexico statute, since repealed, that expressly barred
the export of New Mexico groundwater. The district court enjoined the
state engineer from enforcing the statute, without attempting to test it
against the requirement of reasonableness or to fit it into the Sporhase
exceptions. The court ruled that, outside of fulfilling human survival needs,
water is an economic resource, and the statute's economic protectionism
is forbidden by Sporhase.'9 In effect, the court obliterated the state line
and, except for a small reserve of water for public health and safety, required the New Mexico authorities to treat the growing Texas city and
its fast-growing industrial complex on an even par with New Mexico's
slower, primarily agricultural growth.
The New Mexico statute was replaced with a procedure for considering permits for export in light of the public interest. After first considering the factors involved in every appropriation-protection of existing
rights, conservation of water, and the public welfare-the state engineer
must then consider the need to maintain adequate water supplies for the
state's water requirements, balancing the state-wide and local supply of,
and demand for, New Mexico water against the sources available, and the
demand, at the out-of-state place of use.
In a second phase of the case, City of El Paso v. Reynolds (ElPaso
2),
0 the district court modified its earlier position slightly and gave some
recognition to the Sporhase dictum that a water-short state might give
17.
18.
19.
20.

Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956-57.
563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
Id. at 390-92.
597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
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its citizens a limited preference.2' The public welfare included economic
overtones said the court. The court concluded that a state's efforts to protect its public welfare by conservation measures might include some protection of economic interest as long as this was "only incidental" to the
general public welfare. The court also said though "simple economic promight be suptectionism" is still forbidden some burdens on commerce
22
ported if outweighed by non-economic local benefits. Sporhase and El
Paso deal with different problems-the first with state regulation of
private trading in water and water rights and the second in state allocation of its public domain. This article argues that the Pike test and the
stringent El Paso reading of the Sporhase rules for commercial transactions are not appropriate for testing the validity of state action in
distributing its patrimony.
Professor Corker reminds us of Justice Robert's eloquent statement
of the purpose of the commerce clause:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs, duties or regulations exclude
them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition
from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has
3
been doctrine of this Court which has given it reality."
Sporhase fits this pattern. It would be easier to see this as a "commerce case" if Sporhase had involved twin brothers, each owning one of
the farms. The Colorado farmer needs water for consumption and should
be able to get the cheapest water at hand. This is available from his
Nebraska twin, who must charge a price that will cover the cost of giving
up whatever crop he is growing on his Nebraska field. If this is cheaper
than the price the Colorado farmer must pay a Colorado neighbor, he
should not be driven to a higher price by a Nebraska law that favors its
residents at the expense of the citizens of other states." On the other side
of the line, the Nebraska twin with the well should be able to dispose of
his water or water right in any market where he can get the most for it.
He should not be stopped by his state's embargo, even though it is triggered by the Colorado reverse discrimination law.
In the El Paso situation this market does not exist. When El Paso
applies to the State of New Mexico for a permit to extract and put to use
21. Id. at 700-01.
22. Id.
23. Corker, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: Does the Dormant Commerce Clause
Really Limit the Power of the State to Forbid (1) the Export of Water and (2)the Creation
of a Water Right for Use in Another State, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 407 (1983) (quoting
from H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)).
24. The Colorado farmer cannot appropriate Colorado water. He [Sporhasel applied for
a Colorado permit which was denied on the ground that the safe yield of the aquifer was
fully committed. See id. at 423-24.
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unappropriated water, Justice Robert's ideal is not served. Perhaps El
Paso could have gotten its water from Texas irrigators from the nearby
Rio Grande or overlying land owners who might sell their ground water
to the city25 at a price. But the state of New Mexico does not seek a price.
If two of New Mexico's own citizens seeking in-state uses were applicants,
the state could pick and choose between them "in the public interest" in
order to insure the best use, or it could deny a permit to a single applicant and hold the water for a better future use.26 If it grants the permit
and the water right, it makes no charge to the appropriator.
When the Texas city applies for its permits, the State of New Mexico
does not have "free access to every market in the nation" where, as a seller,
it can find the best price. It does not sell the water, it cannot put itself
on an equal footing with the Texas land owners and bid against them.
Nor would the City of El Paso be the beneficiary of Justice Robert's "free
competition." It would be saved from having to pay for Texas water
because it could reach across the state line and take it without any charge
whatever.
The differences between the two types of transactions can be seen by
noting the very different decisions a state water administrator must make
when approving an export permit to allow a selling appropriator to transfer
his water right to an out-of-state city and when considering whether the
state should grant an appropriation of water for export to an out-of-state
city. In the transfer case, the seller-realistically an irrigator-has a right
to a specific quantity of water (X acre-feet per year) to irrigate specific
land. Whether he can sell it to anyone, in or out of state, depends on
answers to a number of zoning or planning type questions, nearly all
directed at the ultimate question of whether the change in type and place
of use will injure other appropriators. What has been the historic quantity pumped? Will there be any increase in depletion or in the rate of depletion? Is there return flow to the aquifer that will be lost by the change
in place of use, to the detriment of other appropriators? Will there be any
loss in water quality or any effects from pumping year-around instead
of during the irrigation season?
On the other hand, if a new appropriation is sought, the questions are:
Is there water available? What is the "safe yield?" Where will the water
be best used? What is the best use for it? Should it be saved and preserved
for future use? Is the city appropriating more than enough for a reasonable
future supply?
In both situations, questions as to the "public interest" may arise and
may differ between in-state use and export proposals. But for the moment
these questions are postponed, and it is enough to note that the transfer
transaction and the allocation decisions are very different.
25. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 839-40 (W.D. Tex), aff'd, 385 U.S. 35
(1966) (mem.).
26. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
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Sporhase is right and El Pasois wrong. States can live with Sporhase's
ruling that a state cannot tell its citizens that they cannot sell out of state
when it permits them to sell within the state. This applies to both sales
of water and sales of water rights. A state cannot expect to prevent the
interstate sale of water rights to "preserve the neighborhood" any more
than it could prevent a steel mill from closing in a factory town or dictate
the way of life to its rural inhabitants. On the other hand, the states cannot live with El Paso. El Paso would require a state to sit by and see other
states deprive its people of future opportunities for growth and development, while preserving only "noneconomic" water for the public health
and safety of stagnating communities. Without overruling Sporhase,but
with some clarifications in regard to shortages and explanations of legitimate local interests, much water might be saved within states on a territorial-opportunity cost theory, discussed later," without freezing out
neighboring cities. Neighboring cities might be put to more expense either
because they have to pay the opportunity costs or because they must use
available, though more expensive, sources in their own state. The remainder of this article will examine these issues.
SPORHASE AND WATER ALLOCATION: "THE SEVERAL REALITIES"

Many authors seemed to have lost sight of the fact that the Sporhase
Court put the imprimatur of facial constitutionality on an export permit
that would issue only upon a showing "that the withdrawal of the ground
water requested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use
of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare."
First, the Court said that as applied, these conditions might lead to no
more severe strictures than those applied to intrastate transfers. But the
Court went on to say:
Moreover, in the absence of a contrary view expressed by Congress, we are reluctant to condemn as unreasonable, measures
taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its own citizens this
reluctance stems from
vital resource [in water-short areas.] Our
28
the "confluence of [several] realities."
The Court's realities are based upon an unreal understanding of the
climatology and hydrology of the high plains and mountain states and
of the operation of the law of prior appropriation. The Court conditions
its permissible restrictions on export to "times of severe shortage" (the
language replaced by the bracketed materials in the above quote, "times
and places of shortage," and "times of severe shortage." The Court's notion of a "shortage" seems to assume a normal supply sufficient for everyone most of the time, occasionally falling below demands-in other words,
an Eastern-type drought. The Court does not understand the variable
nature of Western rivers, the need for seasonal storage of spring floods
27. See infra note 76 (subsection titled Economic Efficiency As a Legitimate Local
Interest).
28. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
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and snow-melt to provide late summer flows, and the need for "drought-design" in reservoirs to provide carry-over from the years of plenty to the
years of dearth.
Even those states with unappropriated water are "water-short" because of the costs of the dams, reservoirs, canals, wells, pipelines, and
pumping plants needed to store and transport the water. Even where water
flows unused to the sea, there will be found plans, permits, applications,
conditional decrees and legal claims upon this water so that it can hardly
be called unappropriated.
The Court says "a demonstrably arid state" might get special privileges. The dividing line between the arid zone and the humid zone splits
the high plains from North Dakota down through Texas. The arid zone
is scientifically designated as an area29 where potential evapotranspiration exceeds the average annual precipitation. Except for vagaries of
storms, no water would flow off of the land. Yet every Western state has
enclaves of humid climate in its mountains, where rainfall and snow-melt
produce streams that flow to and through the dry plains. The Court also
speaks of a well with perhaps an excessive supply, an extraordinary phenomenon. Where is the excess in a non-recharging aquifer that will be exhausted in twenty-five years at one rate of pumping, in forty years at a
slower rate?
The Court shows little understanding of the law of prior appropriation, with its fixed shares separated by priority, the fences that separate
the property of senior from being taken by the junior, that shifts the entitlement to water depending upon the quantity available at a particular
moment. The Court seems to assume a system of water law that puts an
administrator's left hand on the faucet and his right hand on a hose to
direct the water to the person with the greatest need or higher claim. It
seems to me that to substitute "water-short areas" for "times of shortage" detracts in no way from the Court's reasoning and eliminates all these
problems.
Turning to the "several realities" the Court said: "First, a State's
power to regulate the use of water. .,for the purpose of protecting the
health of its citizens ...is at the core of its police power. 2 30 Of course,
if there are municipal needs for drinking water and sanitation uses within
a state, the state is not bound to deliver water for less important or even
the same needs across the state line. At a minimum, a liberal reserve for
the future needs of the City of Los Cruces and other communities in the
Lower Rio Grande Valley could be set aside from capture by Texas. The
Court says that the water is essential for human survival and speaks of
29. V. CHOW, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED HYDROLOGY, 24-8 (1964).
30. Id. This reading skips the distinction made between the health of the citizens and
the health of the economy that the El Paso court seized upon as nullifying practically
everything else in the opinion. In the case cited for the protection of human health, H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), a restraint on competition was justified
as a phony safety measure. In fact, the remaining realities themselves speak in economic terms.
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this "vital resource."'" The Court also notes, however, that eighty percent of the water supply is used for agriculture.2 Thus, such a reserve
might be a small portion of the whole.
Next, the Court said:
[T]he legal exception that under certain circumstances each State
may restrict water within its borders has been fostered over the
years, not only by our equitable apportionment decrees but also
by the negotiation and enforcement of interstate compacts. Our
law therefore has recognized the relevance of state boundaries in
the allocation of scarce water resources. 33
Some seem to have read this as requiring the legal expectation to have
reached the magnitude of a title arising out of a decree of equitable apportionment, or a compact approved by Congress." I think it means just
what it says-that states with access to a common resource must share
it, that the resource is to be rationed among them, that each owns, controls, and has power over the share allotted it. The Court does not say
that only already apportioned shares will be protected; rather, it says that
the notion that state boundaries have relevance has been fostered by
equitable apportionment decrees and compacts. It is therefore error to
read Sporhase as saying that the commerce clause would allow the unapportioned shares of unappropriated water to be grabbed by an exporter
or that Sporhase prevents the state of origin from protecting its unapportioned share."
In the third reality supporting the ruling that the Nebraska statute,
sans reciprocity, is facially constitutional, the Court says that Nebraska's
claim to public ownership of its ground water is logically more substantial than claims to public ownership of other natural resources (such as
fish and game?), and while this cannot justify a total denial of federal
regulatory power, it may support a limited preference for its own citizens
in the use of the resource. This ownership-that-is-not-ownership can only
be territorial sovereignty over the land, water, and minerals within its
borders. While the right "to take, hold and dispose of property" was on
the first list of privileges and immunities that a state may not deny to
noncitizens, 6 in its initial disposition, a state is free to dispose of property for the benefit of its own citizens.
31. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 956.
34. Including myself; see Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water
Resources, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 347, 349 (1985). See also Rodgers, The Limits of State Activity in the Interstate Water Marke4 XXI LAND & WATER L. REv. 357, 372-76 (1986); Utton, In Search of An IntegratingPrinciplefor Interstate Water Law: Regulation Versus the
Market Place, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 985, 996 (1985).
35. A discussion of the relationship between Sporhase and equitable apportionment
is found infra text accompanying notes 101-136 (section titled "SPORHASE & EL PASO V.
VERMEJO").

36. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 18231 (No. 3230).
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"Territorial sovereignty" gave Colorado authority to step into a priority suit and turn it into an equitable apportionment controversy: "In any
event, Colorado surely has a sovereign interest in the beneficial effects
of a diversion on the general prosperity of the state." 7 This is the foundation of the doctrine of parens patriae; Kansas was said to have an interest as a state, not as a simple proprietor, when the prosperity of a large
tract of land bordering the Arkansas River affected the general welfare
of the State." Closest to the point is McCready v. Virginia,19 in which the
Court allowed Virginia to bar a Maryland resident from farming oysters
on state lands underlying navigable waters. Restricting the use of these
lands to Virginia citizens was held within its powers:
If Virginia had by law provided for the sale of its once vast public
domain, and a division of the proceeds among its own people, no
one, we venture to say, would contend that the citizens of other
States had a constitutional right to the enjoyment of this privilege
of Virginia citizenship. Neither if, instead of selling, the State had
appropriated the same property to be used as a common by its
people for the purpose of agriculture, could the citizens of other
States avail themselves of such a privilege....
The planting of oysters in the soil covered by water owned
in common by the people of the State is not different in principle
from that of planting corn upon dry land held in the same way.
Both are for the purposes of cultivation and profit; and if the State,
in the regulation of its public domain, can grant to its own citizens
the exclusive use of dry lands, we see no reason why it may not
do the same thing in respect to such as are covered by water.... 40
When Alaska found its treasuries overflowing with oil revenues and
distributed the money to its citizens, the Court said a state clearly may
undertake to enhance the advantages of industry, economy, and resources
that make it a desirable place to live. In addition, a state may make residence within its boundaries more attractive by offering benefits to its
citizens in the form of public services, lower taxes or direct distribution
of munificence.4'
This treatment of water resources as part of the territorial base of
the state does not give the state immunity from federal action. All of the
Sporhase "realities" are prefaced with, "in the absence of a contrary view
expressed by Congress."" The Court says that the multi-state character
of the Ogallalah Aquifer-underlying tracks of land in Colorado and,
Nebraska, as well as parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Kansasaffirms the view that there is a significant federal interest in conservation and allocation of diminishing resources.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Colorado v. New Mexico (Vermejo I), 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982).
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
94 U.S. 391 (1877).
Id at 395-96.
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982).
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
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In a previous article, 43 1instanced several scenarios for a possible congressional intervention: one state's ruinous overdraft of interstate aquifer,
state failure to control overdrafts that threaten the nation's food supply,
municipal shortages in the Northeast caused by very large cities in very
small states, and harms to the environment from state rules (or lack
thereof) for withdrawals that allow or fail to control the spread of contaminants in drinking water supplies. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Association,"4 the Court found state law was even preempted when the laws controlled an individual's exercise of property rights
to mine coal and a state's plan for land use.
Territorial sovereignty over water has been proposed by others. Professor Utton finds these cases "may threaten the territorial integrity of
the individual states and, therefore, the balance of those states within the
federal union, thus weakening one of the foundation stones of federalism."4 Professor Corker finds a constitutional basis for territorial sovereignty. Speaking of legislation designed to give states more or less absolute control over exports of water by slurry pipeline, he concluded that
the law was unconstitutional,
not under the commerce clause, which the bills alone address, but
under other parts of the Constitution. Section 3 of the Constitution's federalism Article protects the state without its consent
from having Congress give its territory to another state. The Constitution makers of 1787 clearly had in mind that Congress could
not turn a state's territory into uninhabitable desert. The equal
footing of states is a structural principle not found in constitu6
tional text, but it has vitality.4
Today I suggest that its vitality lies in the restraint of the Court, that
is, the restraint the Court places upon itself. It is too late to argue on constitutional grounds that the commerce clause does not apply to a state's
allocation of its resources. Sporhase was specific: The water in the ground
was an article of commerce, subject to the power of Congress to regulate
and to the negative power of the Court to strike down unreasonable restrictions on interstate movements. The Court clearly intends that the negative
commerce clause shall be coextensive with the power of Congress. In the
recent Garcia case 7 that overruled National League of Cities v. Usery48
and the last vestige of Tenth Amendment protection for state legislation,
the Court said that it has no license to employ free-standing conceptions
of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the
commerce clause.
The possibilities of congressional take-over of ground water management in a particular spot or nationally seems mercifully remote, and it
43. Trelease, supra note 34.

44. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
45. Utton, supra note 34, at 989.
46. Corker, supra note 23, at 443 (footnote omitted).
47. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

48. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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is to be hoped that the take-over by the courts under the negative commerce clause is even more remote. Professor Corker reminds us that when
Congress preempts a state regulatory law, it will enact substantive rules
to replace those enactments struck down and provisions to administer
and enforce the new rules. On the other hand, he notes that a statute or
procedure struck down by the courts under the negative commerce clause
leaves a vacuum that can only be filled with cumbersome litigation. Further, Corker suggests that water management by a court is likely to prove
impossible. 9 But more important than these procedural problems, the case
for abstention comes down to this: The Supreme Court could, but should
not, allow people of other states to strip the slower-growing states of their
assets and resources that give them the promise and hope of future development.
Most of the authors who have struggled with this problem have been
primarily concerned with interstate sources, shared waters to which each
state has access. The Ogallalah Aquifer underlies both of Sporhase's farms.
El Paso deals with a ground water tributary to the interstate Rio Grande.
The only attempt to appropriate a non-shared source for export involved
a Montana farmer who sought an appropriation from an Idaho stream
which did not flow into Montana. The Idaho court refused the appropriation."0
There are only a few "lost rivers" in the West. But, there are quite
a few non-recharging aquifers wholly within one state or aquifers technically tributary to an interstate stream in which lateral transmissibility of
water is so slow that, for all practical purposes, the flow in the lower state
will be unaffected for many, many years. Professor Utton thinks such
aquifers are probably not an important category of water, 5' but today
engineers tunnel through mountains, siphon waters across valleys, and
pump it over hills for any use that can pay the costs.2
Previously, I have urged that wholly intrastate waters are wholly
under the control of the state in which they are found and are waters to
which no other state has a legitimate claim.5' Utton would agree.5 4 If wholly
intrastate aquifers are not solely under the control the state in which they
are found, he would55make them so, urging a congressional statute with
this as one feature.
Professor Tarlock's "duty to share" water resources in general, would
probably make intrastate aquifers subject to the commerce clause.5 6 Certainly, however, no other state could claim that a share or allocation of
an intrastate aquifer be set aside for it. Shares might be a solution in a
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Corker, supra note 23, at 434.
Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 125 P. 812, 816 (1912).
Utton, supra note 34, at 998 n.52.
A second law of hydraulics is "water flows towards money."
Trelease, supra note 34.
Utton, supra note 34, at 998 n.52.
Id. at 1001 n.60.
See Tarlock, supra note 4, at 145-49.
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shared resource, but all that is required in a non-shared resource is nondiscrimination. That could be achieved by taking each application for appropriation as it comes along under the Pike test or the "leave something
behind" public interest test, 7 as may be required. This might be the place
to apply the Court's statement that a "demonstrably arid State conceivably might be able to marshal evidence to establish a close meansend relationship between even a total ban on the exportation of water and
a purpose to conserve and preserve water.""
The final reality seems most unreal. The Sporhase Court stated that
"given [the state's] conservation efforts, the continuing availability of
ground water in Nebraska is not simply happenstance; the natural resource
has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State
may favor its own citizens in times of shortage. 59 This suggests that the
state is a market participant, free of the restrictions of the negative commerce clause, as to that part of groundwater "publicly produced and
owned" by conservation efforts imposed upon the state's own citizens.
Identifying and quantifying this particular water would raise difficult,
if not impossible, problems of administration.6 0 In any situation in which
the limits of appropriation approach, the only solution that seems just
is to treat all of the remaining water as if so produced and owned. Over
the years, state water officials have limited appropriations to beneficial
use, to common law duties of water, and to statutory limits on use and
quantity. For whose benefit? Certainly not to make the water available
in some other state where all of its benefits would better the neighboring
state, increase its revenues, and increase the prosperity of its citizens.
"EL PASO V. PIKE"-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PIKE TEST

If it cannot be accepted that Sporhase is completely inappropriate in
allocation cases, allocation cases can be fitted into Pike and Sporhase and
still leave the state a sufficient measure of control over allocation to protect its interests. El Paso misreads Sporhase and Pike and takes an overly restricted view of their holdings.
A state's different treatment of outsiders, and a preference for its
citizens, is still possible if the restrictions on the issuance of permits for
export meet the Pike test-if the regulation is even handed, if it serves
their legitimate local interests, and if the effects on interstate commerce
are incidental. If it meets all of these tests, it still must also pass a balancing test; the local benefits must exceed the burdens on commerce. The
question is one of degree. Some local interest may be more important than
others. There is some question of whether the local interests are promoted
by some other means with lesser impact on commerce.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 137-144 (section titled

CONCLUSION-A

SUBSTITUTE TEST FOR ALLOCATIONS).

58. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982).
59. Id
60. See Barnett, Mixing Water and the Commerce Clause:The Problemof Produc; Precedent, and Policy in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 161, 168-70 (1984).
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This is hardly a precise formula, all it does is indicate the direction
of the inquiry and gives little in the way of answers. While many effects
on commerce might be incidental to local regulations, much of what we
are talking about, and what the Court has talked about in the past, has
been directed at furthering interstate commerce as the principal objective. Questions of balance and degree are matters of process and judgment.
In its analysis of the Nebraska statute, Sporhase provides some indication of the results of applying the balancing test to the problem at
hand. Using the Pike standards, the Court said:
The only purpose that [Nebraska] advances for [the statute] is to
conserve and preserve diminishing supplies of ground water. The
purpose is unquestionably legitimate and highly important, and
the other aspects of Nebraska's ground water regulation demonstrate that it is genuine."'
The Court notes an administrative determination that there is an inadequate ground water supply to meet present and reasonably foreseeable
needs in the area where the well is located.62 The Court also notes that
the natural resources district has promulgated special rules which define
as "critical" those townships in which the annual decline of the ground
water table exceeds a fixed percentage and that Sporhase's well is located
in such a township. The regulations for critical townships require the installation of a flow meter on every well, specify the amount of water per
acre that may be used for irrigation, and set the spacing required between
wells. The Court goes on:
The State's interest in conservation and preservation of ground
water is advanced by the first three conditions in [the statute] for
the withdrawal of water for an interstate transfer. Those requirements are 'that withdrawal of the ground water requested
is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground
water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare'....
Obviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate
commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of
water out of the State. An exemption for interstate transfers
would3 be inconsistent with the ideal of even-handedness in regula6
tion.
On its face, therefore, the statute received the Court's approval, but
on the assumption, "that the first three standards of [the statute] may
the limitations upon intrastate
well be no more strict in application than
'
transfers imposed by the ...District. "64
While the Court does not limit the legitimate local purposes of conservation and preservation, much of the rest of the language of the opin61. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954-55 (footnote omitted).
62. Id
63. Id at 955-56.

64. Id
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ion, upon which the validity of future cases may turn, is colored by this
phrase. There are other indications; the Court speaks of the "vital
resource," meaning presumably life-preserving; yet, of course, ninety percent of water in the Western states is used in agriculture. The Court's
definition of conservation and preservation is not easy to identify. In some
contexts it seems to mean "nonwasteful" in the sense that the job is done
with the least water needed (no mention is made of the economic side of
waste)." In other places, the Court suggests that the purpose of conservation is "to conserve and preserve diminishing sources of ground water,"
and to promote "the continuing availability of groundwater in Nebraska."' 66 Here, there may be the connotation of a groundwater reserve for
the future.
But lengthening the life of an aquifer, or spreading the water on more
land, is not the only "local public interest" served by Western water laws.
Nebraska leaves to local districts the control of physical waste by well
spacing and pumping limits, and allows overlying land owners to pump
water within those limits by virtue of common law rights. State permits
deal only with export. "Conservation" of resources in Nebraska means
little more than official supervision of water use by the private sector.
Most Western states implement protection and public interest measures through permits to appropriate, which may be denied when some
notion of the "duty of water" or "safe yield" is reached. Historically, the
"local public interest," was focused on the promotion and encouragement
of the best local use of water. This was accomplished by doling out permits for remaining unappropriated water to those who would use the
water. Before permits were required, appropriations were initiated by taking the water and applying it to beneficial use, under the loose supervision of the courts.
Ditches that tapped the stream and carried the water across a state
line for use in another state were recognized and enforced. 67 Eventually,
this was seen as a possible threat to the public interest in obtaining the
maximum local benefit from the water, and statutes were added to allow
such appropriations only if the importing states allowed reciprocal
privileges to the exporter's citizens, or if the permit were approved by
the exporter's legislature as well as by water officials." Many such cooperative arrangements were made.
65. The need for legal controls to promote conservation is less pressing in groundwater
than in surface water. Lifting water hundreds of feet consumes much energy, and few farmers
are going to pay for electric power or diesel fuel in order to slather the water over their fields
without regard to physical efficiency. The same economic controls hold for manufacturers
with cost-conscious managers. Municipal users may not be governed by these money considerations. The city has access to many water users who would not balk at a small charge.
In this situation, the control on waste, however, is better placed on the ultimate users-the
householders who irrigate their lawns or wash their cars-who may not pay full value if the
municipal works are subsidized by other taxes, as is true in many places.
66. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954, 957.
67. Wiley v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 544, 73 P. 210, 225 (1903).
68. See Clyde, supra note 4; Tarlock, supra note 4.
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Public Interest
The first permit statute was Wyoming's 1890 water code that gave
the State Engineer the power to reject an application if, in his opinion,
its approval would be contrary to the public interest. 9 Even before New
Mexico was a state, the territory copied the Wyoming statute. In 1910,
the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court said, in a case where two proponents applied for the same water for essentially the same project, "The
declaration in the first section ... that the waters are 'public waters,' and
the fact that the entire statute is designed to secure the greatest possible
benefit from them for the public should be borne in mind."70 The court
ruled that where competing applicants sought the same water for different
projects for the irrigation of New Mexico lands, the better project should
receive the water.7 The court said consideration should be given to stability and feasibility of the projects and the costs and returns of each. Even
before statehood, a little administrative chauvinism raised its head; but
the court discounted it:
The territorial engineer apparently bases his approval of the latter project as against the former on the fact that Young & Norton and their associates are actual settlers on the land, while
Hinderlider is not a resident of the territory. We do not say this
circumstance should have no weight in the determining the question of the public interest, but we think it should not outweigh
the other considerations to which we have referred."
More recently environmental limitations have been added to
the grounds
3
for denial or conditioning permits in the public interest.
One gets the impression from the Supreme Court's preoccupation with
"conservation and preservation" that it is the only "legitimate local purpose." But the purpose of most state's water laws has historically been,
and is now, to promote the use of water to advance the prosperity of its
inhabitants. A glance at most state water codes shows their agricultural
bias; they are irrigation oriented with minor accommodations to make
them suitable for municipal and industrial users and with recent overlays
or amendments to avoid waste and to preserve environmental values.
Planning
Every Western state now has an elaborate water plan or planning process. These are designated not to produce a blue print for total use, but
to continue the growth of the state's farms, cities, and industries with
the unappropriated remainder of water still found in the state. Professor
69. 1890-91 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 8, § 34 (codified at Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (1977)).
70. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045, 1050 (1910).
71. Id.; see also Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957, 964 (1943); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(2) (Supp. 1987).
72. Young & Norton, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. at 1050.
73. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).
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Tarlock says that New Mexico won its fight with Colorado over the Vermejo River: 4
Both to preserve supplies for internal uses and to assert fair share
claims against another state, states must demonstrate that they
have an adequate process to attempt to maximize the use of available waters. Through legislation and the judicial imposition of
public trust duties, states are moving toward planning and evaluation processes that ask harder questions about the need to develop
new or reallocate existing supplies than have been asked in the
past.75
If the El PasoII court gutted this process when it struck down as a stalling tactic the moratorium proposed by the New Mexico legislature for
a study of the need for water in New Mexico, we are practically back to
the old fashioned prior appropriation with only possibilities of ad hoc
quickie studies of alternatives as applications for permits are made.
I pump the organ for "prior appropriation" as a system of water lawbut always "modern prior appropriation," not the pioneer doctrine that
gave full play to individual action uncontrolled by the state. Individual
action worked well for a pioneering economy. It probably led to a good
deal of maximization, since the best projects are most likely to attract
the capital and enthusiasm to put them into action. The doctrine of prior
appropriation created a system of private rights that were transferable
and that allowed the market to correct early mistakes and facilitate improvements. It lent itself to state control and, especially in the initiation
of projects, to the protection of the public interest, translated by crude
cost benefit analysis into maximization of net benefits. More recently, it
laid a foundation for environmental protection.
Economic Efficiency as a Legitimate Local Interest
Is it legitimate under Pike to allocate the waters found in a state so
as to extract from them the greatest possible benefit for the development
of the state? Sporhase mentioned economic protection as an aside in a
later aspect of the case.
First, a State's power to regulate the use of water in times and
places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its
citizens-and not simply the health of its economy-is at the core
of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we have long
recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the
one hand, and health and safety regulation on the other. [See H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Dumond, . . .].76
74. See Colorado v. New Mexico (Vermejo 1), 459 U.S. 176 (1982); 467 U.S. 310 (1984)
(Vermejo II).
75. Tarlock, The Law of EquitableApportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated
56 U. COLO. L. REv. 381, 409 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
76. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
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A state's allocation of public resources and state regulation of the commercial transactions of citizens are very different things. The state distributing its own public resources, writing a law to guide its administrators who will dole out the resource and create the rights, is in a very different position from the state regulation in DuMond." There, the state
regulation denied a license for facilities that would enable an out-of-state
milk dealer to buy milk for export. The Court found that the purpose of
the regulation was not to protect the purity of milk, but to protect state
dealers from competition for the supply. A state regulating the economy
of local businessmen by shielding their commercial operations from higher
prices is not the same as state protection of its own economy by saving
a dwindling resource to provide for the further development of its other
resources.
The El Paso I court completely misunderstood and misapplied the
Sporhase Court's citation in DuMond. The lower court ruled that outside
of fulfilling human survival needs, water is an economic resource, and
economic protectionism is forbidden by the negative commerce clause.
When the case returned to the district court in El Paso II, the New Mexico legislature had eliminated the embargo and substituted a number of
factors to be considered. The amended statute would allow some water
to be exported if it was not "detrimental to the public welfare of the
citizens of New Mexico." 8 The district court retreated and said that this
requirement was proper since it constituted one aspect of the balancing
process required by Pike. But it said that the burden on interstate commerce must be weighed against putative non-economic local benefits and
again warned against "simple economic protectionism." The court ended
up with an almost circular argument to the effect that the public welfare
of state citizens includes health, safety, recreational, ascetic, environmental and economic interests, and that the state may prefer its citizens to
an extent that includes protecting economic interest so long as this is "only
incidental" to the protection of the "general public welfare." 9
This, I submit, is errant nonsense. The picture of the state engineer
considering an export application, wondering how much water he can save
for the economic future of his state, and pussyfooting around with factors that he hopes will justify holding back a little water, is ridiculous.
The entire purpose of the process is to exercise sovereignty over the state's
resources for the benefit of the state-the very purpose for which it is a
state. Water is territory as much as land; it is part of the resource base
of the state. And, indeed a state's natural resources-land, water, and
minerals-are more than territory; they are the patrimony of the state.
To argue that it has a duty to share this patrimony with other states who
may take it away for their own benefit is to diminish and distort the very
basis upon which the state was founded. It is fatuous to say that it is
not "legitimate" for a state to choose the beneficiaries of grants of resources under its control.
77. H.P. Hood & Son v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 529 (1949).
78. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (Supp. 1984).
79. See City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso I), 597 F. Supp. 694, 700-01 (D.N.M. 1984).
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'80
The Pike test requires the state to regulate "even-handedly." This
Certainly
line.
does not mean, cannot mean, a simple erasure of the state
it does not require that a saintly state engineer treat El Paso as if it were
the most important city within New Mexico. In El PasoI, the court notes
that El Paso is the marketing and commercial center for the lower Rio
Grande Valley in New Mexico. To the extent that El Paso's prosperity
spills over into Los Cruces and communities and farmers north of the state
line, this is a factor in determining New Mexico's public interest. If none
of the benefits return back from Texas, this factor can be ignored. So far
as the New Mexico state engineer is concerned, it does not exist.

When a Western state grants a permit for use within the state, no
charge is made for the water as such. This does not mean that the state
receives nothing in return. We have seen that when applicants for appropriations are mutually incompatible the state may choose the one which
will produce the maximum net benefits to the prosperity of the state,
without regard to priority of filing. In a previous article I demonstrated,
I hope, that it is only the primary benefits of gas wells, mining processes,
and cantaloupes that the state of origin can claim."' Similarly, the state's
interests cease with the first allocation of water. It is the benefits to the
state from the allocation that are to be considered, not the secondary effects of trading in the private sector with the goods produced by the
water's use. At a minimum, the primary benefits are the real estate and
severance taxes produced by the farms, factories, and homes that directly use the water and any income or transaction taxes arising from the
initial transactions of the appropriator. The secondary or multiplier effects of the income and taxes resulting from trading in the water are the
kind of citizen prosperity that the state cannot, and must not, control
under the commerce clause.
If the competitors are a person proposing an instate use and a person
seeking water for export, one use promises prosperity for the state and
revenue for its treasury while the other use will generate prosperity and
revenue in another state. Is the state where the water is found and the
state that has sufficient jurisdiction over the water to determine who may
use it acting evenhandedly if it says to the applicant for export, "you may
have the water if you will contribute the same or equivalent benefits which
we would receive from instate use?"
82
South Dakota, in the same circumstance, required a payment in cash.
It also required the exporter to drop off water to small communities along
the route of the pipeline. Wyoming, under similar circumstances, asked
that exporters add features to their projects that would allow local farms
83
and communities to share proposed storage. Would a procedure that
allowed a study of such factors and comparisons of benefits be "evenhand-

80.
81.
82.
83.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970).
Trelease, supra note 34.
Trelease, supra note 43, at 371.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-301 (Supp. 1986).
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ed," even though the search is for conditions and extra contributions extracted from the exporter that would not be imposed from the local user?
It is not entirely clear that the cash, extra facilities, and supplies to
local irrigators and communities were extra conditions imposed on exporters. These were, more likely, attempts to capitalize on the "coal rush,"
which developed when the huge beds of coal found under the northern
plains offered tremendous wealth (as long as oil was at $32.00 per barrel).
Some conditions imposed on the slurry pipelines (adding local features)
might have been imposed upon instate coal users as well. The premature
collapse of the energy boom prevented history from being played out.
There was talk in Wyoming that an energy company's application for
a low dam at the last good site on a stream with a flow greater than needed for the coal might be denied unless the dam were heightened and the
reservoir enlarged to take care of local projects. The total project was said
to be physically and economically feasible, although the incremental
features individually were not. This is a time-honored practice in Bureau
of Reclamation projects where one feature subsidizes another in the name
of full development. Similarly, dam builders and diverters are commonly
required to incorporate structures into their projects or to release
minimum flows, that add to costs or subtracts from benefits, in order to
preserve and even enhance environmental and recreational values for the
public. 4
Aside from this, even if the exporter clearly has to make a contribution or bear costs not imposed upon the local user, this is even-handed
treatment, as long as he is making some contribution to the state of
origin's economy equivalent to what would have been made by a use within
the state. If there is a "duty to share," as Professor Tarlock says, 5 it
means at least to share on equal terms with the local appropriator. Some
attempt, however rough, to equate the "extra" burden imposed on the
exporter with the opportunity costs to the state, or to require a cash contribution to replace lost taxes, is certainly not unequal treatment.
The state may be willing to take considerably less. Economic maximization is not the only goal. It goes without saying that a state may
deny an appropriation to anybody, local and foreigners alike, on environmental grounds, such as the preservation of a lake or water fall. That
kind of conservation is certainly permissible even where the burden is on
out-of-staters and the benefit is to the local people. Suppose, for example, there is a stream feeding a lake or falls near a state border. Water
from the stream might be physically available to the exporter only from
the lake or above the falls. The request by the exporter to take the water
might be denied to preserve the lake or falls even though local appropriators could take the water from the stream below the falls or after it
leaves the lake.
84. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
42 Cal. App. 3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1974).
85. See Tarlock, supra note 4, at 145-49.
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Finally, a state might, in granting permits, consider many things relating to the public interest in addition to economic maximization. It might
be as simple as simply saving water for future local use. The City of El
Paso, apparently, asked for practically the entire predictable safe yield
of the New Mexico aquifers. A requirement to "leave some water for us"
to satisfy predictable future local needs might be a sufficient "public interest" to satisfy Pike,even though the balance of costs and benefits might
not come out very favorably when the municipal and industrial uses in
Texas are compared to small increases in agriculture in New Mexico. In
United Plainsmen,86 equating the public interest with the public trust, the
North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that before all of the unappropriated water in North Dakota was unthinkingly allocated for boom and
bust coal development, some should be saved for future farmers and preservation of a stable agriculture industry.
A simple loss of water for future development is not the most likely
problem. Few states have appropriated or planned the ultimate diversion
of the last possible drop. The real problem imposed by progressive use
of more and more water is increase in the costs of obtaining the water.
The problem may be that if easily available cheap water is now used, the
extra costs of storage required for the use of spring floods and above
average annual flows will be considerable. Here again, while not common,
there are precedents for imposing costs on large local projects to keep
Intrastate
water within the economic reach of less favored future uses.
87
by
spawned
laws
storage"
"compensatory
the
in
parallels can be found
west slopes and
the inter-regional rivalry between Colorado's east and
8
California's statutes protecting the "area of origin," resulting from its
internal north-south rivalry.
Even reciprocity may play a part here and turn out to be even-handed
regulation. In many situations, the Western states have permitted use
of local waters in another state if the other state allows reciprocal
privileges to the citizens of the first. A prime example is the Little Snake
River (aptly named) which, with its major tributary, crosses and recrosses
the Colorado-Wyoming line twenty-two times. Many ditches head in Wyoming, have a Wyoming water right, and take the water to a Colorado field,
while many Colorado ditches feed Wyoming hay meadows. These states
have said to each other, "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours. You
can have my water if I can have some of yours." An even trade may not
be required; the possibilities could be enough.
86. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
87. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-45-118(1)(b)(iv) (1973).
88. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 11460-11463 (West 1971). While these statutes are a
political promise of the legislature that can be changed at any session, Professor Ralph
Johnson's legal study for the National Water Commission concludes that it is a pledge by
the state that the needs of Northern California will be taken care of in future water plans
primarily for the benefit of Southern California. Johnson, MajorInterbasin TransfersLegal
Aspects, Legal Study No. 7, at 81 (National Water Comm'n. 1971).
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Pike Balancing
If a statute meets the Pike test, Pike says it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits. This obviously calls for a procedure in which
the balance can be determined. The Pike Court went on to say: "If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend
on the nature of the local interest involved . . . ."8
There are, of course, several different kinds of balancing. The Pike
test says that the burden on commerce should be compared to the local
benefits and may even outweigh them, as long as the burden is not "excessive." A city, industry, or district is always going to look for the
cheapest water, and a free appropriation in another state will often be
cheaper then buying out a local user. It may even be cheaper than obtaining a new instate appropriation. The burden in El Paso is the cost of purchasing Texas water and constructing facilities for its use against the cost
of wells and a pipeline to New Mexico. In other words, the burden is measured by how much El Paso saves by using New Mexico water. This figure,
which might not be as large as first thought, must be compared to the
opportunity costs in New Mexico.
The public interest factor applied to local projectso allows the exporting state to balance the benefits of use for El Paso's municipal and industrial water against future New Mexico agricultural water, and one
might expect this to favor the city. Yet this balance is not made in El
Paso. Neither Pike nor Sporhase required the El Paso court to simply erase
the state lines. The balance might go the other way when the burden on
the receiving state is balanced against different benefits in the originating
state.
The availability to the exporter of local supplies is also very important in answering the question of whether the lower state is hoarding its
own resources for its own future uses instead of using water available to
it. While El Paso is not the State of Texas, its actions can be considered
state actions, as was the case in Kansas v. Colorado9l and Wyoming v.
Colorado.2 Here too, the Court seeks equity between states when their
citizens by the use of water threaten to disturb the balance of power between the states.
Incidental Effects on Commerce
The Pike formula seems to contemplate a regulation of general application to all commerce in which "the effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental." Since the laws currently enforced or recently adopted
that might survive the Pike test are directed specifically at procedures
89. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
90. See Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 115 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
91. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
92. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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for handling water exports, it may be difficult to say that their effects
are only incidental. Yet, the main objective here is to require the exporter
to leave something behind to avoid loss to the state of future benefits,
to make some equivalent substitution of facilities for local use, or to avoid
the imposition of extra costs upon future local users. Thus, the direct objective is to equalize the benefits to the state of appropriations for in-state
and out-of-state uses. The contribution of the exporter is a side-effect that
an event happening "in
meets the dictionary definition of "incidental" as
3
important."1
more
something
with
connection
Another possible result is that commerce would not occur; the water
would not be exported because the permit is denied or the conditions imposed make the appropriation unattractive. But that effect-nonuse by
the unsuccessful applicant-will occur in any "public interest" choice of
this project or that, of this use or a better future use. If the applicant
for export is unsuccessful because he lost to a legitimate local interest,
the location of the lost use is merged in the decision and is only an incident to the determination.
FacialDiscrimination
The Nebraska statute prevented Mr. Sporhase from exporting his
water because the reciprocity requirement called into play the Colorado
embargo on exports. On its face, an embargo is presumptively unconstitutional. The Pike formula provides a basis for sustaining a statute which,
on its face, only reasonably restrains commerce, leaving the validity of
its applications to individual cases. But even if the regulations are found
not fair on their face, and even if they openly discriminate, they still might
be sustained.
The Sporhase Court's invalidation of the reciprocal embargo was based
v. Oklahoma,94 which struck down a ban on the export of bait
Hughes
on
minnows. The Hughes Court decided that such a blocking of the flow of
a commercial product at the state borders could not pass the Pike test
and added new tests for facially discriminatory legislation. It must survive the "strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose,"
and there must be "the
it must "significantly advance" that interest,
9
still another case, Dean
In
alternatives."
nondiscriminatory
of
absence
"a close fit between
Milk, 6 the Court added another twist by requiring
97
the Sporhase Court
and
the requirement and its asserted local purpose,"
to achieve
tailored"
"narrowly
be
statute
the
that
piled on still another:
that fit.9"
In Maine v. Taylor99 the Hughes tests were applied in the latest commerce clause case. Here the golden shiner joined the Oklahoma Minnow,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1968).
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 337.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
Id at 354.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986).

WEBSTER'S
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the Tennessee Snail Darter and the Devil's Hole Pup Fish in the Supreme
Court's aquarium. Maine forbade the import of Golden Shiners from other
states, ostensibly to protect its local population from parasitic infestation, but incidentally protecting the local bait fish industry from competition. The Court sustained the embargo once the difficulty of inspection
and other preventative methods was explained. The Court's concluding
sentences will be heard in future litigation over water exports:
The Commerce Clause significantly limits the ability of states and
localities to regulate or otherwise burden the flow of interstate
commerce, but it does not elevate free trade above all other values.
As long as a state does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade
or attempt to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation,'...
it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources. 00
Different treatment is not necessarily discrimination. It is possible
for states to impose reasonableregulations that further a state's interest
in its natural resources by statutes fair on their face according to Pike
and even by statutes that clearly encumber and even bar movement across
state lines.
"SPORHASE & EL PASO v. VERMEJO"
Almost contemporaneously with Sporhase, the Supreme Court decided two aspects of an interstate law suit for equitable apportionment of
the water of Vermejo River, a small stream that rises in Colorado and
enters New Mexico where it is entirely consumed.' 0' The doctrine of
equitable apportionment, it is said,0 2 is incompatible with the Sporhase
application of the commerce clause. Equitable apportionment magnifies
the state line, splits the river basin, and splits the river with it. It has
been said that Sporhase does quite the opposite, it erases the state line,
treats the basin as a single economic unit, and the water resource as a
management whole. 10 3

This is certainly not true, at least regarding the Sporhase holding. As
the Court noted, the two farms and the state line both overlie the vast
Ogallalah Aquifer. 04 Nevertheless, the Court treated the water as if it lay
wholly in Nebraska, like an oil field in the middle of the state, the product
of which the state wanted for its own citizens' consumption.
The Sporhase case has nothing to do with equitable apportionment,
any more than that oil field does. The water right for the Nebraska farm
existed. There is no evidence that the change of place of use would increase the draw down of the aquifer. If at some later time the water was
100. Id. at 2455.
101. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 178 (1982).
102. See Utton, supra note 34; Simms & Davis, Water Transfers Across State Systems,
31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-7 (1985).
103. Id.
104. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
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divided between the two states, it might be found that Nebraska exceeded its share when the well was first drilled and placed on the Nebraska
farm, not when the water was removed to Colorado. Mr. Sporhase's rights
rise no higher than those of Nebraska; he and his neighbors, entitled to
reasonable shares of Nebraska's share of the whole, might find themselves
subject to a percentage reduction of pumping to eliminate the overdraft. 10 5
If Colorado appropriators have added to the overdraft, the junior Colorado
06
pumpers may be cut off entirely by priority.'
No such claims were made. There was no indication that Colorado
wished to apportion the aquifer. It had its own rules-favorable to Nebraska-for preventing overdrafts at the state line. ' An off-the-record
fact showed Sporhase was denied a Colorado permit for his Colorado farm
because the Colorado limit would have been exceeded. 0 8 If additional
withdrawals in Nebraska drain Colorado, the Colorado Ground Water
Commission might urge the State of Colorado to seek apportionment of
the affected part of the aquifer. In the alternative, Nebraska might seek
protection from a change in Colorado's rules that would allow more drilling in Colorado and prevent the movement of Nebraska's share of water
to the Nebraska wells. Joint administration of the aquifer to manage well
placement, well depth, well spacing, total pumping, and rate of pumping,
all with reference to the optimal, physical management of the resource,
may be desirable. But there is nothing to prevent a compact being
negotiated, an executive agreement reached, or a multi-state district
formed to accomplish these things, and there is nothing in Sporhase that
would make it impossible or more difficult.
"El Paso v. Vermejo"
A major question that has often been asked is whether commerce
clause considerations apply to fixed shares of unappropriated water in
a common source to which two or more states have access. In my previous
article, I instanced the split by compact of the Powder River, forty-two
percent of the unappropriated water to Wyoming, forty-eight percent to
Montana. 0 9 If Montana uses all of its water, is it now free to go up-stream
into Wyoming, a state developing water at a slower pace, and take a part
of Wyoming's share? If the shares of unappropriated water have been
allocated by compact, a very strong case can be made that a state's share
is beyond the reach of the negative commerce clause. It has been held that
a compact adopted by the states and ratified by Congress is an act of Congress.10 In this light, it is positive exercise of the commerce clause that
leaves no room for judicial modification or the operation of the negative
commerce clause.
105. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
106. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 622 (1945).
107. See Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 194 Colo. 489, 575 P.2d 372,
376 (1978).
108. Corker, supra note 23, at 423.
109. Trelease, supra note 43, at 348.
110. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983); Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River
Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985).
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It is unlikely that shares will ever be assigned directly by congressional allocation. Arizona v. California"'is the only example of this method
of adjusting interstate conflicts. But, that case twisted existing legislative
action preliminary to a project into a division of water. The prospect of
one state introducing a bill in Congress that will settle its claims to unappropriated water against other states by assigning a percentage or quantity to it is almost unthinkable. Likewise, the probability of the other fortyeight or so unaffected states taking sides on such a bill seems remote.
It is conceivable that the authorization of a multi-state project could be
called a partial allocation to the states which receive a portion of the project water. This reduces the size of the problem but does not solve the question of whether a state has or controls a share of the remaining water.
A case in which the water in a shared interstate resource is already
over-appropriated, and in which it is necessary to find the dividing line
between the states, does not present this problem. This is exactly the
Nebraska v. Wyoming"' situation on the North Platte River, the archetype
of the equitable apportionment cases. Neither Sporhase nor El Paso has
any effect in these cases.
Even the judge in El Paso I seemed convinced that if he were dealing
with compacted or equitable apportioned water, New Mexico could do as
it pleased with its share." 3 A great deal of space in El PasoI was devoted
to proving that the Rio Grande Compact did not divide the river and its
tributary groundwater below Elephant Butte Dam." 4 If it had, New Mexico could apparently keep its share.
While the Supreme Court has never divided unappropriated water
among the parties to an interstate law suit, it has equated its decrees with
compacts. Sporhase says that these divisions create legal expectations.
Were the Court to decree such a split, it is clear that the shares so allocated
to a state are exclusively that state's to manage. It should also be clear
that it would be reasonable under the commerce clause for the state to
withhold its entire share for its own cities and landowners.
There are those who believe to the contrary. It has been suggested
that, in the absence of explicit territorial limitations, the Court will tend
to be unfavorably disposed toward state restrictions that interfere with
providing water to expanding population centers. It has also been suggested that a compact must be specific in providing a state with the exclusive use of a quantity of water for the Court to conclude that the commerce clause doesn't apply." 5 There are some compacts which are specific
as to where the water may be used. Others, which are vague and make
no reference to the potential place of use of the water, may be vulnerable
to commerce clause reallocation under this view." 6 Professor Tarlock
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

373 U.S. 546 (1963).
325 U.S. 589, 622 (1945).
City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso 1), 563 F. Supp. 379, 387 (D.N.M. 1983).
Id.
See Rodgers, supra note 34, at 374-75.
Id
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thinks that in general a state has, under the commerce clause, a "duty
to share its resources with the rest of the nation," but does not address
the problem directly.' Professor Corker argues that the basis of interstate
compacts is dismantled if the Supreme Court somehow intended that the
'
interstate character of the source is irrelevant. 1s
El Paso'sruling reduces any state incentives to compact to shambles.
The more slowly developing state will seek negotiations but will have no
bargaining power. The faster developing state will have no reason for trying to bargain if it can force the assignment of water to it under the commerce clause.'19
If compact negotiations prove impossible, a state with an inchoate
claim to a common resource may consider the possibility of firming up
its claim into the "legal expectation.., fostered by [an] ... equitable apportionment." ' " While the Supreme Court has never yet declared the
equitable share of two or more states in unappropriated water to which
each has access, there seems little doubt that it could do so. Equitable
apportionment has been a flexible, developing remedy. It started as a tort
action. The first case, Kansas v. Colorado,'' was a suit to enjoin present
harms to Kansas from Colorado's use of the Arkansas River. Relief was
denied in an opinion jammed with facts but short on law, either upon a
de minimis or damnum absque injuriarationale, after a balance of the great
benefits to Colorado compared to "some detriment" to Kansas. The next
cases were similar, but brought to prevent future harms. In the "Eastern
apportionment" case, New Jersey v. New York,' the Supreme Court
limited a transbasin diversion of the Delaware River by New York City
to an amount that would avoid pollution and other environmental damage
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Out West, in Wyoming v. Colorado,'3
and Nebraska v. Wyoming'4 injunctions were sought against future harm
to downstream users from the operation of new projects on the Laramie
and North Platte Rivers. These cases, however, involved over-appropriated
rivers.
Equitable apportionment came to be a sort of quiet title action, fixing the boundary line in the waters, as it were. The next stage must be
the evolution into a declaratory judgment of rights to take future actions.
The old precedents are against it. In two cases, New York v. Illinois'2
and Connecticut v. Massachusetts,1" out-of-basin diversions in upstream
states caused the lower states to complain that future production of electric power would be hampered or prevented. In both, relief on this ground
was denied.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Tarlock, supra note 4, at 145-49.
Corker, supra note 23, at 426-27.
Id. at 430; Utton, supra note 34, at 996-97.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982).
206 U.S. 46 (1907).
283 U.S. 336 (1931).
259 U.S. 419 (1922).
325 U.S. 589 (1945).

125. New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488, 489 (1927).
126. 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
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Despite these older cases, the Court has entertained one case involving rights to unappropriated water in which no present harm was shown.
Arizona v. California"7 was brought before the Central Arizona Project
was authorized. The Project's intake was upstream from California's diversions, and Arizona could suffer no physical injury from them. Arizona's
main claim was for 2,800,000 acre-feet of unappropriated water as a future
supply for the C.A.P. if that project should ever be built. As it turned
out, the case was not decided on equitable apportionment grounds, but
the Court's treatment of the jurisdictional question is nevertheless on
point. In taking up the suit, the Court said:
The basic controversy in the case is over how much water each
State has a legal right to use out of the water of the Colorado River
and tributaries .... [T]his Court does have a serious responsibility to adjudicate cases where there are actual, existing controversies over how interstate streams should be apportioned among
Unless many of the issues presented here are adStates ....
judicated, the conflicting claims of the parties will continue, as
they do now, to raise serious doubts as to the extent of each State's
right to appropriate water from the Colorado River System for
existing or new uses. In this situation we should and do exercise
our jurisdiction."'
In Arizona v. California,the Court was asked to allot a specific quantity for a single project which had long been studied and planned. This
is different from the situation where no project is planned. In the latter
scenario, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to place itself in the position of parceling out resources in a fashion that will mean placing limits
on future growth of a state. The Court may be hesitant to charge a Master
to study state plans and decide on the most worthy, the most likely, or
the most desirable before all ramifications of such plans unfold. The prospect of reviewing the Master's decision on the evidence may seem similarly
unpalatable. The Court may prefer to wait and decide on projects as they
arise. However, this may put it in the position of case-by-case review of
state administrative decisions, a situation which it has sought to avoid
in the past.
If it is accepted that a decree of the Supreme Court, or a compact with
a neighboring state, gives a state a share in an interstate resource, which
the states may withhold from other states and allocate for locally preferred purposes, the question arises whether a state has such a share before
the "legal expectation" has been fixed by decree or compact. Legal title
does not seem necessary. When Idaho sought a division of salmon fishing
in the Columbia-Snake River System between it and the states of Oregon
and Washington the Supreme Court said:
The fact that no State has pre-existing right of ownership in the
fish, Hughes v. Oklahoma, does not prevent an equitable appor127. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
128. Id. at 551, 564.
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tionment ....
Even though Idaho has no legal right to the
anadromous fish hatched in its waters, it has an equitable right
to a fair distribution of this important resource. 2 '
It had been argued that no state can fix its own share in the resource,'30
and ultimately this is true as limits of the resource are reached. Before
the limits of the resource are reached, however, the states have done exactly that. This has been the law since Bean v. Morris"' back in 1911,
where Justice Holmes applied priority between appropriators taking water
from a single stream that flowed out of one state into the other. Because
a junior appropriator in one state had to respect senior's rights in the other
state, each appropriation became a part of the apportionment of the state
where used until the limit of the stream was reached. Certainly a state
may say, "At least this much is mine," and allow applicants to acquire
rights to water not used by those in the other state.
There have been some so-called exceptions to this "priority is equity" rule. In 1945, in regards to the North Platte River, Justice Douglas
stated his oft-quoted modification:
That does not mean that there must be a literal application of the
priority rule .... But if an allocation between appropriation states
is to be just and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule
may not be possible. For example, the economy of a region may
have been established on the basis of junior appropriations. So
far as possible those uses should be protected though strict application of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for the application of an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive
use of water in the several portions of the river, the character and
rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas
if limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue.
They indicate the nature of the apportionment 2and the delicate
1 3
adjustment of interests which must be made.
Although junior appropriations in Colorado were allowed to continue,
Justice Douglas did not actually analyze or apply his "laundry list," and
no court has ever done so. The junior Colorado appropriations were four
hundred miles from the stateline Nebraska appropriations. It would take
two to three weeks for water released in Colorado to reach Nebraska. The
harm to Colorado would exceed the benefit to Nebraska. The case is an
application of the well known priority rule of the "futile call." Stored
129.
130.
131.
132.

Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) (citation omitted).
See Corker, supra note 23, at 441.
221 U.S. 485 (1911).
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1987

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 22 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 8
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXII

waters, return flow, etc. bear on the fact that little if any harm was done
in the Nebraska reaches by the Colorado diversions.
Nevertheless, this is a doctrine that seems to have appeal. In Vermejo I' l l the Court called it "the flexible doctrine"' 3 and indicated that
the water allocated by one state to its users might be reallocated for the
benefit of the other state if the former allocation were excessively wasteful.
Also, Vermejo I struck down the key position of priority when it reversed
the Wyoming v. Colorado rule'3 5 that Colorado farmers could not take
water from Wyoming ranchers simply because they might make more
money growing row crops than the ranchers could make growing hay. This
nineteenth century type "balancing' '-the idea of uncompensated transfers of wealth-producing resources on some theory that society is benefited
by impoverishing a property owner because his neighbor might make better use of the property-has never been the law.' 3 6 This is the antithesis
of prior appropriation.
CONCLUSION-A SUBSTITUTE TEST FOR ALLOCATIONS

The real test of a valid or permissible state restriction on interstate
commerce is that it must be reasonable. The Sporhase Court looked for
factors that "informed the determination whether the burden on commerce
imposed by state ground water regulations are reasonable or unreasonable ...."In The Pike test is an attempt to give the concept of reasonableness a little more content, if not clarity or certainty. But the Pike test
was evolved for a particular case-one inwhich state legislation imposed
an extra burden on a commercial grower of agricultural products and put
the exporter at a disadvantage on the interstate market. The Pike test
has since been applied in practically every case in which the Court has
considered the negative implications of the commerce clause.'38 These cases
involved state requirements placed on possessing, packaging, and transporting goods, embargoes against the export-import of minnows or golden
shiners, requirements for instate processing of lumber destined for outof-state shipment, and an embargo against the import of garbage to commercial land fills. Pike is consistent with older cases holding that a state
may not restrict the use of natural gas produced within the state to the
benefit of its citizens.' 9 All these cases involve state restrictions on the
commercial transactions of producers, traders, and transporters of products and goods that were once natural resources but are now in the hands
of those who have exploited and captured them.
133. Colorado v. New Mexico (Vermejo 1), 457 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
134. Id

135. 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
136. Although the Court in Vermejo II jColorado v. New Mexico), 467 U.S. 310, 321-23
(1984), repeated the view expressed in Vermejo I, that one state might claim water already
appropriated in another, it dismissed the case, holding that Colorado had not shown by clear
and convincing evidence that better use could be made of the water in Colorado.
137. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 953 (1982).
138. Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause,and State Control of NaturalResources, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 63-65.

139. Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 260 (1911).
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But the El Paso-typesituation is outside this pattern. The water would
move across the state line, as in the Sporhase case, but not in a market
transaction, as we have seen the Sporhase water did. The statute in the
El Paso case does not regulate traders or transporters, but state officials
in the performance of their duty to allocate natural resources in the public
domain to use in the private sector.
Not even the Supreme Court regards the Pike test as a universal solvent. The Court has added the rule that statutes that on their face
discriminate against interstate commerce can be validated on a showing
that the restriction serves a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
served as well by any available nondiscriminatory means.' 4 0 Two other
categories of cases are treated differently from those involving the regulations of trading: Commerce clause limitations on state taxation and the
question of whether state regulation has been preempted by congressional
action."'
The test of reasonableness that might properly replace the Pike test
is that the exporter and the domestic user of water make the same or
equivalent contributions to the state of origin. The water is a resource
of the state, a source of wealth, present and future. When a resource within
a state is exploited, the state, as a sovereign, receives some benefits from
the activity. This is an important state interest; it is a part of "sovereignty." Sovereignty is not ownership and does not insulate resources from
the rest of the nation or the national government. But it does give the
state the power to regulate its citizens and others who obtain interests
in its land, waters and other resources. It is the source of the police power;
it enables regulation in the general welfare; it gives the power of taxation. It has been used to justify Montana's heavy tax on the exported
product of coal resources: "The entire value of the coal, before transportation, originates in the State, and mining of the coal depletes the resource
base and wealth of the State, thereby diminishing a future source of taxes
and economic activity."''
In the field of water, the Supreme Court said in Kansas v. Colorado""
that the doctrine of parens patriae, permits a state to protect its citizens
and their property from the inroads of the citizens of other states. In a
very recent case the Court said of the use of water by a large industrial
company: "In any event, Colorado surely has a sovereign interest in the
beneficial effects of a diversion of the general prosperity of the State.""
This does not mean that a state may hoard its resources for its citizens
alone. State A does not care if a citizen from state B buys land, grows
cantaloupes, drills an oil well, or otherwise enjoys the resources of the host
140. See Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2448 (1986); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 336-37 (1979).
141. Hellerstein, supra note 138, at 65-66 n.80.
142. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1931) (footnote omitted).
143. 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907).
144. Colorado v. New Mexico (Vermejo I), 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982).
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state. The nonresident still makes his contribution, produces wealth, and
increases the tax base as much as would a citizen-owner.
The exporter of previously unallocated water will make no such contribution if the Pike test is used and the El Paso gloss on Sporhase is
followed. The "economic protectionism" they forbid is exactly what the
state is due. The exporter should leave behind some equivalent of, or
capitalization of, or replacement for, the contributions that would be made
to the state of origin if the water was used at home instead of abroad.
The substitute test merely permits the state to claim its due.
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